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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Anchor-handling operations  
Anchor-Handling Tug Vessels (AHTVs) perform 
what is known as advanced marine operations, ex-
treme marine operations, or simply anchor-handling 
operations. Anchor-handling vessels are an im-
portant part of the offshore operations in the produc-
tion of oil and gas on the Norwegian continental 
shelf (NCS). According to statistics from the Nor-
wegian Shipowners' Association, the offshore indus-
try in Norway consists of   approximately 600 ves-
sels, where AHTV and supply vessels are the biggest 
category.  The fleet is the second biggest offshore 
fleet in the world next to the US. Furthermore, this 
industry employs more than 12500 people and deliv-
ered 24 percent of the total value creation within the 
Norwegian maritime industry in 2012 (Maritimt Fo-
rum 2012). Moreover, in 2011, this industry is said 
to create values of more than NOK 30 billion, in an 
industry that creates about 150 billion in total. 
The operations on board an AHTV vessel involve 
many dangerous work situations, which demand a 
strong focus on safety before and during operations. 
Seafaring has mortality rates considerably higher 
than populations ashore (Hansen et al., 2002; Rob-
erts, 2002). 
    The standard rig move operations are integrated; 
anchors are recovered to the AHTVs, the rig moved 
to a new location, and anchors are placed at the new 
location and connected to the rig—all in one opera-
tion. This operation may take 6-10 days and requires 
a rather stable weather window. Also, it requires 
tight coordination between the parties; the rig and 2-
4 anchor-handling vessels, where one of them has 
the lead. 
1.2 Rule-based offshore petroleum culture 
The offshore petroleum industry in Norway is con-
trolled by regulations, guidelines, and standardiza-
tion of operations. In this way, the industry is charac-
terized by a rule-based organizational culture and 
structure, with normative concepts of behaviour.  
The aim of a rule-based safety regime is to reduce 
accidents on board and to develop a safe workplace. 
The regulating authority for all vessels and movable 
rigs on the Norwegian Continental Shelf is the Nor-
wegian Maritime Directorate.  
The planning of offshore operations has to follow 
certain guidelines. A "Risk assessment document" is 
prepared by the operator, the oil company, or a com-
pany contracted as Marine Representative. The plan-
ning is based on experiences of what could occur or 
previously have occurred. The guidelines are the 
NWEA, version 2 regulations. This is a generic doc-
ument, which is intended for continuous updating 
during the preparation period and during operations, 
in accordance with the incidents occurring. A pre-
paratory meeting is arranged with all parties present. 
The Guidelines and Risk assessment are presented 
and discussed. The risk assessment is revised as a re-
sult of feedback from that meeting.  
When the vessels are hired from the spot marked, 
there are no vessel representatives at the above meet-
ing. Long-term contracts, however, allow such rep-
resentation.  
At the base during mobilisation, the marine repre-
sentative arranges a familiarisation meeting for all 
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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to explore different safety cultures in anchor-handling operations in 
the Norwegian offshore petroleum industry; how the crew and management cope with both critical and dan-
gerous operations, compared to the periods in-between operations that are characterized by routine work. Be-
tween operations, officers function as middle managers fulfilling organizations needs for control, predictabil-
ity and audit requirements. During operations, dangers and complexity demands full focus and presence 
towards that specific situation. Thus, the different demands are balanced by actualizing two different safety 
regimes and work practices. The discussion in the paper is based on two research projects conducted in 2009 
and 2013, focusing on safety conditions at anchor-handling vessels. 
vessel crew. This is a presentation of scope and a 
safety brief. 
1.3 Safety culture  
The relation between safety and culture has been one 
of the main topics of safety research for the last dec-
ade (Guldenmund, 2007; Haukelid, 2008; Stiansen, 
2009). Research has shown that the cultural aspects 
of work practice influence safety as much as tech-
nology and formal organization structures.  
According to Gherardi et al. (1998), safety is 
strongly linked to the work practice of a community. 
It is a collective competence that has developed 
through experience and training of seamanship. This 
also influences what is considered safe or dangerous 
behavior during operations on board. The seamen's 
identity is shaped by what is appropriate within the 
norms and values of the culture on board, and influ-
ence the way they perceive safety rules (Knudsen, 
2005). According to Knudsen (2009), good seaman-
ship is a blend of professional knowledge, profes-
sional pride, and experience-based common sense. 
Safety is also strongly linked to management of 
safety, where the aim is to control and measure an 
organization's operational performance. According 
to Petersen (1978), safety conditions can be identi-
fied, predicted and controlled – through the means          
of defined work processes and procedures. Planning 
and setting goals are also a part of safety manage-
ment.  
In this paper, we address both these views of safe-
ty: 1) the importance of the culture of the seaman 
crew due to safety and 2) the impact of the offshore 
control routines concerning safety.  
2 METHODS 
 
The collection of data is based on qualitative meth-
odology, involving semi-structured interviews, un-
structured conversations and observations onboard 
AHTVs during operations. One researcher covered 
integrated operations over a period of one year 
(2009-2010) and one researcher covered a week’s 
operation during a pre-lay operation in 2013. The 
main data source from the one-year fieldwork is thus 
participation on board AHTVs and interaction with 
crews on these vessels (Røyrvik 2012). In addition to 
participation and observation, structured and semi-
structured interviews from all positions on board 
were conducted, on board narratives were collected, 
and operation documents were studied. In addition, 
the researchers participated in relevant contexts, 
such as operations planning, pre-operational meet-
ings, AHTV operational and safety procedure simu-
lator training programs and R&D related contexts.    
The positions interviewed in the 2013 data collec-
tion were: captain, first officer, chief engineer, deck 
foreman, ROV supervisor, surveyor, mooring super-
visors/controllers and marine representative for the 
operator (oil company). Interviews were transcribed 
from audio files, as all interviews were recorded. 
The quotes used in this article are all translated from 
Norwegian. Observations with conversations in be-
tween interviews were conducted over a period of 
around 14 hours daily. Observational notes were tak-
en at the time the observation was made or shortly 
thereafter and included in a field log as documenta-
tion. As the observations, participation and inter-
views that form the empirical basis of this article 
were made and conducted in 2009 and 2013, respec-
tively, comparisons allow for discussion on devel-
opments in both operational practices and safety 
management.     
3 RESULTS 
 
Based on the analysis from the fieldwork, we will 
describe the characteristics of the working and living 
conditions on board the anchor-handling vessels. 
Overall, we found that the management and crew of 
seamen on board both strongly prioritize safety to 
avoid occupational accidents and major organiza-
tional disasters. How this is performed is very much 
affected by the fact that these vessels are part of a 
long-standing sailor tradition and a strong industry 
managerial regime. Thus, the officers are expected to 
function both as ship officers, focusing on seaman-
ship, yet at the same time as middle managers of the 
greater corporations. The role as middle manager in-
volves detailed planning and control in an effort to 
follow safety procedures and routines. 
Depending on the organization of the particular 
operator, the oil company, as many as seven differ-
ent parties may be involved in an anchor handling 
and rig move operation. The oil company may 
choose to include several of the functions from in-
ternal resources or use outsourced resources. The 
functions or processes involved are: A drilling man-
agement responsible for planning and drilling, an 
offshore marine representative advising the drilling 
management and operator being the representative 
on board the senior AHT, a planner func-
tion/company, drilling company/rig owner, site sur-
vey to confirm the correct site, navigation company 
to find and document the correct location, weather 
forecasting company and anchor and mooring han-
dlers. 
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3.1 Anchor operations 
The core func- tion of AHTVs is to re-
position oilrigs, floating installa-
tions that are anchored to the 
sea- bed 
while 
they search for 
oil. In principle, an anchor opera-
tion consists of three parts: re-
cover an-
chors 
at rig loca- tion, tow 
the rig to new location, and re-
lease anchors and reposition them 
on the 
seabed according to position data. Traditionally, an 
anchor operation consists of three main parts: 1) the 
pulling of an anchor, loosening the rig from the sea 
bed, 2) tugging the rig to a new position, and 3) an-
choring the rig in place at that new position. Such 
operations involve coordinating four AHTVs and 
one rig. Furthermore, an operation typically involves 
recovering and repositioning eight anchors, with 
each vessel working with and taking on board two 
anchors and their anchor systems.  
The new pre-lay type operation consists of one 
recovery and pre-lay operation and one concerted (4-
5 days) rig move (1-2 days). This requires two sets 
of anchor mooring spreads, one owned by the moor-
ing equipment supplier and the other often owned by 
the rig company. The spread is left on the seabed  
from a previous rig move about 2 weeks prior. An-
chors (usually 8) are all recovered and brought to the 
new location and spread according to a spread plan 
and buoyed with light buoys. On the rig moving day, 
the anchors at the “old” location are all buoyed, the 
rig is moved with the help of two AHTVs, wires are 
recovered and the rig connected.  
Prior to any operation, a decision has to be made 
whether to carry it out as a pre-lay or integrated op-
eration. There are advantages and disadvantages to 
both types of operations, and they both involve com-
prehensive planning: mooring analysis and equip-
ment, vessel requirements, additional personnel, lo-
gistics, notification of others parties of location, and 
various risk assessments, such as Safe Job Analysis 
(SJA).  
3.2 AHTV vessels 
The AHTVs vary in terms of hull design, and there 
are different kinds of propulsion systems, as well as 
anchor handling systems. Some of the more modern 
AHTVs are equipped with an ROV (Remotely Con-
trolled Vehicle) to inspect the seabed and recover the 
anchor lines. This significantly reduces the need for 
grappling functions (see section below). Neverthe-
less, there are some characteristic similarities be-
tween all AHTV vessels, like the positioning of the 
living quarters and bridge afore, the long working 
deck at sea level and the large winches mounted to 
the living quarters facing the work deck. The dual 
work chairs of the coxswain and the winch operator 
are another special feature of AHTVs. During opera-
tions, their work positions are at the bridge, over-
looking the work deck. Independent of the type of 
AHTV, the positions on board are highly special-
ized, from the bridge and deck to the engine depart-
ment.  
The vessel is built specifically for towing and oil-
rig anchoring. Towing implies towing a rig from one 
location to another, and oilrig anchoring means an-
choring the rig so it sits steadily in the water. To 
achieve this, four or five vessels must collaborate to 
stretch and tighten the enormous wires or chains, and 
anchor them to the ocean floor. The anchor is some-
times a kilometer away from the rig, so the thick 
wires are bound to be very heavy.  
To cope with the great forces of the wire or chain, 
as well as nature, the vessels are very powerful and 
thus very demanding on resources. As the operations 
also take place some distance from shore, the vessels 
usually spend weeks offshore to get as much work 
done as possible on each trip. Each vessel can be 
considered to be a complete and integrated organiza-
tion, because of the limited physical frames the crew 
live and work within over some time. The crew all 
have different tasks, qualifications and responsibili-
ties, and everyone and every task is necessary in or-
der to be able to stay offshore for such extended pe-
riods of time every trip. Some are responsible for 
food, some for cleaning, and some for maintenance 
of the vessel.  
3.3 Positions on board 
The crew consists of a minimum of 13: four on the 
bridge, four on deck, four in the engine room and 
one cook. Usually though, cadets and apprentices 
join the crew in training to become officers or able 
seamen, and it is common that the size of the crew 
varies between 15 to 20.  
The four people working regularly on the bridge 
hold positions of captain, chief officer and first and 
second mate (sometimes two first mates). These four 
work closely together. During operations, the captain 
and one mate work on one shift together, and the 
chief officer and the other mate work the second 
shift. The shifts rotate—six hours of work and six 
hours of sleep, which implies that for twelve hours a 
day, two of the officers sit next to each other on the 
bridge collaborating on controlling the tension of the 
anchor systems, coordinating the work on deck to 
minimize risk, and making sure that the vessel is 
working properly. Between operations, they are also 
working and living closely together, and although 
other aspects, such as age and different personalities, 
influence the way the crew interact with each other, 
it is clear that “the bridge” defines both work and 
social roles and relations.  
This is true also for the other positions on board. 
The able seamen, also working in pairs during opera-
tions, have their own work areas—the work deck—
and resting area—the dirty mess, which allows for 
the seamen to rest and wait for orders still in their 
work outfits.  
The work carried out in the engine room is con-
sidered a bit more separate than the other tasks on 
board. As with the other positions, they work in pairs  
(and depending on the engine, there may be a day-
time electrician as well), monitoring the systems on 
board the ship, tinkering with the engine and spend-
ing their working hours mostly without having to 
coordinate their work much with anyone other than 
the captain. 
As a crew works closely together, a collective 
practice of both work and social interaction devel-
ops. This is true both for those working in similar 
positions as well as for those working at similar 
times. During operations, the same ABs and officers 
will collaborate  around the clock, as well as eat and 
sleep at the same times. As a result, although con-
ducting the same work, crew on different vessels, as 
well as different shifts and the different positions on 
board may both work and socialize differently.  
3.4 In between operations 
Anchor operations must be performed during specif-
ic weather windows. A weather window in this con-
text means predicted weather conditions that are de-
fined as safe enough for the time it takes to carry out 
the operation. The technical definition of a weather 
window, in this context, is when the significant wave 
height is predicted to be less than 3.5 meters 1.5 
times the predicted operational time (DNV rules for 
marine operations). A typical operation may last for 
many days. Therefore, in the North Sea, and espe-
cially during the winter months, anchor-handling in-
volves a lot of waiting around and working in-
between operations. 
If the weather forecasts predict an extended wait-
ing period, the crews will stop working shifts and 
work on maintenance during the day, perhaps wash-
ing down or painting the vessel, fixing tools, check-
ing the electrical systems and so on. As  hiring an 
AHTV is expensive for operators, they may decide 
to use the vessel in other types of operations, if the 
waiting period is predicted to last long. These opera-
tions, such as cargo runs, are considered to be con-
siderably less difficult and dangerous, and, as a con-
sequence, the atmosphere on board during such 
operations is more relaxed, and the crew is more so-
ciable and talkative.  
The workday is also very much characterized by 
paperwork and safety management. Most tasks per-
formed on board include some type of risk, either 
from being performed in an exposed environment 
(such as outside in high waves, or high up some-
where), from involving heat (such as welding work), 
or from working with hazardours substances (like 
paint or gasses) or closed environments.  
In these cases, and many others, permissions are 
required in order to perform the tasks. SJAs are per-
formed, and an officer, together with the one who 
performs the task, must sign that they have per-
formed the analysis and that they have taken every 
safety precaution required.  
3.5 Advanced operations 
The first step of an operation is to lower the grapple 
in to the sea. The able seamen have prepared and po-
sitioned the grapple at the back of the ramp on the 
work deck. Grappling means fishing with the grap-
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pling hook, for a wire located on the seabed, which 
is connected to the anchor at one end. This process 
may take some time, and can’t be carried out by the 
bridge alone, so, depending on the time of day, it is 
common for the rest of the crew to come and ob-
serve the grapple being lowered and the grappling to 
begin. It is a bit of a competition between the vessels 
to see who is the first to recover the wire/chain and 
bring it on board, and so the atmosphere on the 
bridge is slightly excited and easy. As soon as the 
wire/chain is on board though, it is secured by the 
so-called “shark jaw” (a device that locks the wire 
and later chain in position), and it is time for the 
sailors to go out on the work deck and connect the 
wire to the vessel’s winch, and for the bridge to ap-
ply tension to the system. 
From the moment that the wire is connected to 
the vessel and tension is applied to the system, the 
situation, and thus also the atmosphere, change dra-
matically. Now, if something goes wrong, simply 
sailing away is no longer an option (as the vessel is 
connected to an external system), and the energy that 
could be released if anything were to happen is po-
tentially catastrophic due to the tension of the sys-
tem. As a consequence, everyone, and the vessel it-
self as a collective entity, goes in to a focused state 
of mind. Silent concentration falls over all aspects of 
the boat and crew; all interaction is reduced to carry-
ing out the operation, like a purposive bubble of ex-
treme presence.  
The majority of the hours during an operation, are 
spent “driving the chain”. In the North Sea, depend-
ing on the depth, an anchor may lay a kilometer or so 
from the rig. And when the chain between the rig 
and the anchor is either recovered or put down into 
the sea, the winches that either pull or release propel 
the vessel—while the propellers or thrusters are used 
to maintain position or a specific heading. This work 
goes on for hours and hours, in a monotonous and, at 
first glance, seemingly routine way.  
Although this seems like a routine part of the op-
eration, it has proven to be very dangerous work. 
Every chain link weighs about 20 kg, and handling 
and controlling a one-kilometer chain is thus highly 
demanding on both equipment and crew. The inci-
dent involving Bourbon Dolphin showed the conse-
quences of losing control of such forces; the currents 
affected the chain, which in turn dragged the vessel 
out of position. The crew and the vessel fought the 
forces that pulled them off course for hours, but a fa-
tal turn of events, after hours of fighting, caused the 
ship to suddenly capsize. This final and tragic event 
happened very fast, as the weight of the chain made 
the pull direction drag from the port side after a ma-
neuver intended to ease tension and increase the ma-
neuverability.  
It is literally a matter of life and death for the 
bridge crew to maintain their focus and control the 
situation in order to follow the precise line of motion 
that ensures the tension and pull, keeping the vessel 
in the right position. When anchors are set, they are 
tested for tension. The anchors are pulled with a set 
force, called bollard pull, in order to test if the an-
chor is able to hold its position in the seabed during 
a calculated 100 years worth of impact from weather 
conditions. During the test, the bridge is mostly si-
lent. Everyone is waiting for the moment of truth; 
will the anchor hold or break? Thumbs up if the test 
is successful and the anchor is holding within the 
seabed. If not, the process has to be repeated all over 
again, and the operation is redone.  
The great tension of the anchor systems poses a 
considerable danger, not just for capsizing the ves-
sel. More often, accidents or so-called near-miss-
incidents endanger the sailors working on deck. The 
wires recovered from the seabed might be twisted, 
releasing energy stored by the twist when they are 
pulled up. If a wire snaps, the backlash would seri-
ously hurt anyone being hit. The entire system of ac-
tivities is potentially dangerous, and at the same 
time, the work conducted out on deck is both physi-
cally demanding and conducted in harsh environ-
ments. Therefore, it is of great importance that there 
are no misunderstandings that the deck is clear when 
tension is released on the system, that a bolt is not 
left inside or not fastened when it should not, and so 
on. The bridge and the deck crew therefore depend 
on knowing that the others involved knows every 
situation as well as they do themselves.  
4 DISCUSSION 
This paper explores the safety culture at two levels: 
1) the culture and work practice among the seamen 
on board performing the operations (occupational 
culture), and 2) the organizational culture of the off-
shore petroleum industry in Norway, i.e. safety man-
agement systems/regimes that involve detailed plan-
ning and control of operations. These two 
organizational cultures have different ways of per-
ceiving and performing safety.  
4.1 Two modes of work  
The two safety cultures described above are reminis-
cent of how Pool (1997) and Weick & Sutcliffe 
(2007) describe so-called high reliability organiza-
tions (HROs), exemplified by a nuclear aircraft car-
rier from the US Navy and Diablo Canyon nuclear 
power plant in California. A central issue in Pool's 
discussion focuses on how certain organizations can 
be strictly hierarchal, with factors such as rank and 
routine, and being more dynamic in character on the 
other. The latter mode is of crucial importance when 
the organization is facing stress, for example during 
the launching and recovering of planes on board an 
aircraft carrier. The gear engaged "when things heat 
up", is distinguished by a focus on communication 
and expertise, rather than rank, stability, predictabil-
ity and thick manuals. The success of high reliability 
organizations lies in their ability to include, request 
and balance these two "modes of operation" within 
their organization. This requires, for example, in-
volvement from everyone in the organization. One 
should, on board the aircraft carrier, be able to 
achieve a situation where "the welfare of the ship 
and crew is [seen as] everyone's responsibility 
(1997:261). Pool continues by stating that: "Besides 
communication, high reliability organizations also 
emphasize active learning, not simply the memoriza-
tion of procedures. Employees should not only know 
why the procedures are written as they are, but 
should be able to challenge them and look for ways 
to improve them" (1997:266). Being part of this pro-
cess of active learning, the rotation of crews is por-
trayed as an advantage for the organization rather 
than an obstacle. As Pool argues: "The collision of 
fresh, sometimes naïve approaches with a conserva-
tive institutional memory produces a creative tension 
that keeps safety and reliability from degenerating 
into a mechanical following the rules" (1997; 261). 
This argument shows both the existence of two 
modes of work, and how safe work practices stems 
from the co-existence of these. 
On board an AHTV, the transition between the 
two modes is very noticeable. First, there are struc-
tural changes in how the crews organize and conduct 
their work. They begin working six hour shifts at 
their respective work positions, not allowing for any 
non-work related social interaction except during 
meals. Second, there are very noticeable changes in 
the atmosphere on board. The crewmembers’ pres-
ence changes very much—they are quietly focused 
on the tasks they conduct. Words exchanged are 
work-related, information-redundant messages such 
as “clear deck” or “release tension”. The atmosphere 
mirrors the tension of the anchor system, when the 
weak link is broken, the crew ease out.  
4.2 Occupational culture 
The social organization of a ship is often character-
ized as a "total institution" (Goffman, 1961). To en-
ter into a total institution is to leave a multitude be-
hind and instead be surrounded by and eventually be 
part of a universe, which is "something more than a 
formal organization, but […] something less than a 
community" (Goffman 1961:103). 
  Total institution refers to the fact that a ship is 
not divided into isolated arenas for interaction, but 
instead represents a collapse in that respect, in the 
sense that the seafarers on board spend 24 hours a 
day in the same place, and the activities they engage 
in—both related to work and leisure—are carried out 
simultaneously and with the same people. The sea-
farers on board are there to make sure the operation 
goes smoothly and on schedule. In other words, a 
ship is first and foremost a place for work.  
We found that during anchor handling operations, 
it is much more important to “have control” than to 
control and audit the job. In order to manage having 
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control among the seamen, one important assump-
tion is competence, training, work experience and 
autonomous tasks on board. The findings from the 
interviews illustrate this, as one of the seamen on 
deck experienced the importance of autonomous 
tasks: "If the foremen are giving orders all time on 
deck, you may feel unsecure about the work tasks. 
Then things may go wrong. Luckily, our manager 
doesn’t tell us what to do in detail." Being a good 
seaman seems to have much to do with working au-
tonomously, without having someone telling you 
what to do, and to deal with unforeseen events as 
they arise. 
We found management style to be essential in the 
effort to empower crewmembers. Based on our find-
ings, the management on board holds the belief that 
crewmembers learn what to do by performing work 
tasks. As one of the deck foremen stated: "When new 
seamen arrive on board, I think it's very important to 
let them know what's happening on the vessel. It's 
important to be hands-on and allow the new seamen 
to be actively involved in the operations. This is how 
they learn."  This is another example of how the 
management on board is involving the crew: "I'm 
not a kind of manager that tells the seamen what to 
do. Here, we plan and do the operations together, 
and it works well." We find that the managers on 
board empower the crew to develop practical skills 
and being able to perform as a team.                                                                              
This is in accordance to one of the five principles 
of HRO; deference to expertise, established by 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2007), focusing on the respect of 
the HRO for the expertise held by the operator. De-
cisions regarding how to perform are made at the 
front end of the operation, rather at the top. This rec-
ognizes and takes care of the knowledge held by 
front end operators. In anchor handling operations 
the expertise on how to best perform safely stays 
with the deck team as a team. The Captain is in 
charge of what to do according to the scope of work, 
but he mostly leave to the team how to perform. The 
effectiveness of knowledge and experience sharing 
in a team will, however, depend upon the openness 
and trust established (Jonassen, 2014). 
4.3 Balancing regimes 
Within the oil and gas industry in Norway, major 
companies have largely standardized the work pro-
cesses on board in an effort to control and measure 
operations. Safety management systems (regulations, 
procedures, work processes) may influence safety on 
board in a positive way, such as carrying out neces-
sary operations planning.  
In the case from 2013, we found that a new posi-
tion had been included on board the AHTV. The 
mooring equipment, such as anchors, links and 
buoys, is often hired from a mooring company for 
pre-lay operations. The company will then supply 
and control the complete logistical chain, including 
control work on board. Controllers are positioned on 
board to control, in detail, all the mooring equipment 
and register all the numbers on individual pieces. 
They socialize with the crew, as they spend time to-
gether in the dirty mess while waiting in between 
operations. In addition to other possible gains, this 
position may be seen as serving the needs of both the 
organization (by auditing the work, registering and 
reporting) and the situation (as the controller is not 
disturbing the performance or presence of the sea 
farers). Although the formal reason for this position 
is to serve the control function, their presence is so-
cially accepted by the added on board value they 
provide and their position among and with the ABs 
in the dirty mess. Ideally then, this type of resource 
both adds to the structure and standardization (needs 
of the organization) and contributes to on board flex-
ibility.  
From the example above, the addition of the con-
troller function seems to contribute to a stronger fo-
cus on controlling safety on board. Making sure 
work processes comply with strict safety require-
ments and routines, leads to more administrative 
work on board, compared to earlier. According to 
Knudsen (2009) and Antonsen (2009), the seamen 
seem to have an aversion against the introduction of 
new rules and requirements by written procedures. 
They don't consider this very useful for operations. 
The seamen perceive it as traditional ideals of sea-
manship being under attack by attempts to regulate 
work by formal regulations and more paperwork. 
There appears to be a great deal of inconsistency 
between the informal ideals for work performance 
and the formal ideals conveyed by safety procedures 
(Antonsen, 2009). Formal work requirements seek to 
standardize work processes. Standards can be seen 
as formalized rules that serve to prescribe and doc-
ument efficiency and control within and across or-
ganizations. According to Mintzberg (1988), there 
are four different forms of standardization: standard-
ization of work processes (specification of how 
worked is to be performed), outputs (what is to be 
done), skills (education and certification of compe-
tence) and norms (share a common set of beliefs). 
Another effect of standardization is simplifica-
tion, which is a two-edged sword. On the one side it 
helps people to better understand and remember. On 
the other it covers the fact that a complex structure 
or organization actually is complex. Imposing an im-
age of simplicity may lead to dangerous situations. 
The reluctance to simplify is another of Weick & 
Sutcliffe’s principles of HROs. Standardization re-
flects the experiences of past and may represent a 
hindrance to solve or prevent future problems. As 
Hollnagel argues: “Safety cannot genuinely be im-
proved only by looking to the past and taking pre-
cautions against accidents that have happened. Safe-
ty must also look to the future. It must be proactive” 
(Hollnagel, 2008). 
Standardization may be contrasted with improvi-
sation. Improvisation refers to what is not planned 
for and involves a low degree of predefined struc-
tures. The weakness of standardization may be less 
room for improvisation (Antonsen, Skarholt and 
Ringstad, 2012). According to Antonsen et al. 
(2012), improvisation skills are necessary when un-
foreseen situations occur on board. In such situa-
tions, the management and crew have to quickly find 
solutions that have not been planned for and for 
which no procedures exist. The ability to improvise 
is very much dependent on the empowerment and 
autonomy among the crewmembers, in addition to 
knowledge of each other's experience and compe-
tence. This kind of expertise develops in a strong 
community where seafarers share norms and identi-
ties.  Leadership practices influence the crew's abil-
ity to act in such situations. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this article was to discuss how a rule-
based safety management culture and an occupation-
al culture influence safety on board. On board an-
chor handling vessels, cultural traits of both industri-
al management and experience-based seamanship is 
present. Between operations, officers function as 
middle managers, filling the organization’s needs for 
control, predictability and audit requirements. Dur-
ing operations, danger and complexity demand com-
plete focus on and presence in that specific situation. 
The different demands are thus balanced by actualiz-
ing two different safety regimes and work practices.    
We found that the seafarer's skills, experience and 
close collaboration are strengths in terms of safety 
on board. Safety is, to a great extent, a matter of 
maintaining control over work carried out within an 
organization. In this paper, we have discussed how 
control is gained through good seamanship charac-
terized by a culture of empowerment, responsibility, 
experience, and, not least, a strong focus on safe 
conduct during the operations. 
We conclude that rule-based safety and the work 
practice among the crew on board are mutually de-
pendent.  Safety management systems (regulations, 
procedures, work processes) influence safety on 
board in a positive way, for example by requiring 
necessary operations planning. However, the need 
for control in the offshore oil and gas industry seems 
to increase, as seen for example through the new 
control position and function on board. In the future, 
the challenge thus becomes maintaining what is con-
sidered to be good seamanship; professional 
knowledge, professional pride, and experience-based 
common sense. 
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